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Woe unto them who add field unto field 
Until there is no place.
Blessed is he who makes
Two blades to grow
Where only one grew before.
The labourer is worthy of his hire.
Man does not live by bread alone.
Twenty years largely wasted....
Trying to learn to use words and every attempt 
Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure 
Because one has only learnt to get the better of words 
For the thing one no longer has to say, of the way in which
One is no longer disposed to say it......And what there is to
conquer... has already been discovered
Once or twice, or several times by men whom one cannot hope to
emulate - but there is no competition -
There is only the fight to recover what has been lost
And found and lost again and again: and now under conditions
That seem unpropitious. But perhaps neither gain nor loss.
For us, there is only the trying....
Who are only undefeated 
Because we have gone on trying.
- "The Dry Salvages"
T. S. Eliot
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Introduction
The Prophets denouncing land amassment (and resulting wrack renting tenancy) 
and the non-practice of the Jubilee Year redemption (forgiveness) of land and 
debt may seem far from the problems of employment and unemployment as seen in 
industrial economies. They may seem equally unrelated with the blessing on 
enhanced output which the profits of the Green Revolution are eager to amass 
to their wealth. The "casual” (albeit not in the necessity or arduousness of 
the job) agricultural labourer of the Gospel may seem rather far removed from 
the unionised factory worker (albeit not from the "stoop" labour Cesar Chavez 
seeks to organise) and the prelude to the Gospel miracle a reason to put the 
other topics aside as secondary. The last quotation indeed can be taken - 
viewing its author's conclusion as evidence of failure to comprehend his own 
failure - as a warning against going on trying to grapple with unemployment 
because it always has been with us, is now and ever shall be, crisis without 
end Amen.
But that is not how it looks from sub-Saharan Africa - from parched farmlands 
or mechanised irrigation schemes from which smallholders have been "relocated" 
(as the scheme descriptions carefully tell us usually with less precision on 
how or where and none on with what results) - from the half deserted offices 
where a minimum wage earning clerk has about a fifth of minimum decent 
subsistence needs if he or she is single and a twenty fifth if seeking to 
support a household or the silent hospital amid an epidemic of twenty year 
cured diseases reborn by a collapse of nutrition and medical services which it 
can know but not touch as the budget for vaccines is ended (or as the budget 
line says "Pro Memoria", like the human beings its absence has sentenced to 
die) - from the bustling market where "Kiosk Rules - OK" but the average 
'customer' can only feast eyes on what two decades past parents (or a younger 
self) bought or an urban "low income area" (or "decanting zone" for "improved 
self help housing" schemes' victims) where "100$ access to pure water" is 
real...if each household uses one pail a day and takes 3 minutes to fill it on 
a 24 hour a day queue at the taps.. .assuming all are in working order.
Very few people are unemployed - except refugees with no access to land, no 
access to even 'casual' labour and next to none to any self employment except 
that so little productive as to be a mockery and even they are - from dawn to 
dusk and from 5 to 80 - very much employed, at begging. The reason is simple 
enough: with no state unemployment relief (or survival support for the
unemployed) and a breakdown of traditional systems (or of many individuals’ 
and households' links to them) to be unemployed in the industrial economy 
sense would mean death by starvation.
For two thirds of the economically active the basic question of employment is 
not that of finding a job but of finding access to useable land to till and 
means to till it for her (two thirds of crop production is done by women) to 
provision the household and have something to sell or to contribute to his 
(three quarters of cash sales are from men’s portion of production) small 
commercial output. For only a tenth does employment mean a wages or salaried 
position as most residents of the industrial world have come to know them. 
The other quarter are ’self employed' - as ’casual’ labourers pushing carts 
and carrying bales; hawking tee shirts or cabbages or thirty varieties of 
fourteen grains the casual 'expert' sees as indistinguishable; cooking noon 
meals to sell on the edge of storm drains (too often open sewers); mending 
worn out shoes (or making new) from five times worn out retread tyres or 
watches with bits of wire for tools and parts (yes, sometimes they do tell 
time again); dyeing bright patterned cloths (with 50$ interest on the cloth 
and dyes - a week that is - and 75$ margin on tha cost - if the buyer does not 
bargain too hard or go to one of fifty other sellers); serving as unpaid 
apprentices to an artisan or, scrabbling to begin a motor repair ’business’ 
with a cracked spanner, a half tin of used oil, a broken file and a patched 
inner tube.
Here the standard international organisation - trade union as much as any 
other - definitions of employment, self employment and unemployment wilt in 
the 3un and blur into sodden ink stained blotting paper when the rains come. 
The Old Testament economy is distinctly closer. If unemployment means 
inability to be productive enough, enough days in the year and fairly enough 
paid to live at a minumum physically and socially acceptable standard on what 
one produces, unemployment in the non-industrial world is 33 to 40$ according 
to ILO estimates. Or using the World Bank's definition of "absolute poverty" 
in sub-Saharan Africa it is over 50$ (65$ of rural and 35$ of urban
households).
Here too the debate on budget deficits and too expensive social services has a 
different focus if one looks beneath the international terms in which 
"°ubtless to the comfort of both the international and domestic discussants) 
it is usually carried on. Government health budgets average 1$ of Gross
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Domestic Product - i.e. there is $3 per human being per year to pay for 
doctors, nurses, cleaners, building, beds, meals, drugs, syringes, linen or 
rather $6 per human being with "access to" (that is within 3 miles radius) of 
a health facility as over half are not. Surprisingly somehow that does mean 2 
visits per human being (one must suppose 4 for those with "access" and none 
for the others) per year. But this is on average - in one poor country it is
0.26$ ($0.85 or $2.80 for those with access) and 0.4 (1.33 with "access") 
visits per year and in another (supposedly yet poorer) it is 1.25$ ($3-00 but 
only $4.25 with "access" as here it is 70$ or higher) and 4 visits (3 in 
rural, 10 in urban areas) a year. The $ are on the face of it trivial, the 
difference on the ground and to the would-be patient is that between a 
disintegrating, half gangrenous remnant of a national medical service which 
often cures the nutrition problems of vultures (including those who control 
the flow - and leakage - of drugs and salaries) better than other ills and a 
desparately stretched, drug starved emaciated one which is still trying and 
still doing much (especially now it has a transfusion of $6 million - $0.33 
per human being - a year of additional basic drugs). To the fiscal ’experts' 
(in fairness not all and not all from at least one of the most criticised 
agencies) the difference is slightly different - the first country is carrying 
out an exemplary fiscal adjustment and the latter is profligate and unwilling 
to "improve austerity" and "cut out fat".
The old urban/rural distinction too begins to waver like a mirage in the far 
flung, long lasting droughts that have driven millions into urban slums and 
more millions into treks to less disastrously wracked rural areas where their 
pressure now sets off environmental degradation eating the once non-marginal 
land from within like a cancer faster than the desert claws at the exposed 
margins. The poorest rural households do not "at least have their food", they 
grow little else but not enough to provision themselves for the "hungry 
season" before the harvest even in good years. They must seek off farm work - 
from less poor farmers usually - in a "free" market with the only remaining 
constraints on exploitation extended kinship and community "archaic 
traditional values". The typical urban household needs five or six pieces of 
employment (however, whereever and whatever) to exist (or more politely 
subsist) again largely to be found on "free" markets constrained largely by 
external (and internal - in at least one case led by devout, modern Western 
value oriented, middle class Christians) pressures to reduce "excessive real 
wages" (say $1.00 - $2,00 per day for formal sector unskilled workers and 
$2.00 - $3.00 per day for drivers, secretaries, primary school teachers, and
' *
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other "semi-skilled”) and encourage greater '’diligence1 and a "return to the 
land”. The rich too are always with us - urban and rural. The proprietor of 
the large (subsidised) mechanised farm, the businessman with access (whether 
legitimate or less so) to goods to sell, the professional able to provide 
services (on his own or because his official job gives him the ability to do 
so), most of the expatriate technical assistance experts presiding over what 
is called aid to reconstruction; these are not poor and whether the proportion 
who act as "good Samaritans” is higher than that in the Gospel case is
somewhat doubtful.
No - the poor of sub-Saharan Africa do not live by bread alone. Except in the 
most crushing of disasters (communal or household) they are human beings with 
pride as well as a frightening humility born of desparate need, hope as well 
as despair, joy as well as grief. To assert that the anomie written on too 
many faces in many Asian metropolises and villages or in too many burning riot 
headlines in the UK press is not the norm in Africa is true - one of the few 
consoling truths. The statistics do not tell the whole story but they do not * 
lie either. Christ fed the 5,000 (or the 4,000) and He needed the 5 loaves
and 2 fishes (or possibly slightly more or less - then as now empirical
evidence from different observers is imprecise and open to different 
interpretations even when the basic facts and meaning are clear enough) and He 
saw it as appropriate to do so before He preached. The emandation that drops 
the "alone” from the words is modern not biblical and falsifying not
simplifying.
The following table - like all tables reciting aggregated averages - makes 
reality too simple, too homogenous and too easy on the reader who does not 
live in the reality behind it. But with an effort of will, to which its
figures do provide a staring point, it does provide a vivid and far from
consoling sketch of what poor sub-Saharan Africa is and what Ghana (a quarter 
century ago the blazing star of hope for prosperity and health and education
and employment that half a continent saw as lighting the way onward and up)
has become. That is the objective correlative behind any sets of concepts, 
any arrays of words, anything one wants to say or the way in which one needs 
to be disposed to say it about employment and unemployment in sub-Saharan 
Africa today.
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TABLE
SELECTED QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS:
1960 - MID 1980*3
Ghana
Late Low Income Sub-
1960 1970 1970’s 1980’s Saharan Africa
(1982)
1. Average Life Expectancy
at Birth 45 49 55 53 48
2. Infant Mortality Rate 132 107 86 107-120 118
3. Child Death Rate 27 21 15 25-30 24
4. Access to Health 
Facility (b) - - - 30 45
5. Public Health Facility 
Visits Per Person 
Per Year . 0.7 0.4 2'
6. Health Budget as 
% of GDP - 1.2 - 0.26 0
7. Access to Pure Water (c) 
Rural 14 14 48 14
Urban - 86 86 75 62
Total - 35 35 60 22
8. Access to Excreta 
Disposal (d)
Rural 40 40 30 25
Urban - 92 95 65 69
Total - 55 56 44 32
9. Average Calorie Avail­
ability as a % of 
requirements 92 97 88 68 91
10. Child Malnutrition 
(Moderate/Severe) - - 36 50-55 40
11. Primary Education 
Enrollment Ratio (e) 38(46) 64(75) 69( 80) -(80) 69 (—
12. Adult Literacy 27 30 - 35-45 44
13. Education Budget as 
% of GDP - 3.9 _ 0.85 2
14. Proportion of Population 
Below Absolute Poverty 
Line (f)
Rural 60-65 67-1/2- 65
Urban . 30-35
72-1/2
45-50 35
/2
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Principal Sources: World Bank, Comparative Analysis and Data Division,
Economic Analysis and Projections Department (June 1984), 
World Development Report 1985; UNICEF, Statistics On 
Children In UNICEF Assisted Countries (April 1985);
Ghana: Situation Analysis of Women and Children (July 
1984).
Notes: a) 1960 data refer to a year between 1959 and 1961; 1970 between
1969 and 1971; late 1970’s between 1975 and 1980; 1980’s to 
1982, 1984 or 1985.
b) Defined in terms of location within a 5 kilometre radius. May 
overstate for Urban population when facilities available are 
small.
c) 1970 and late 1970’s Urban figures may be overstated by failing
to relate number of water points to population.
d) 1970 and 1978 figures for Urban and possibly Rural area3
overstate by failing to relate number of drop-holes to supposed 
user population.
e) Adjusted for length of primary cycle. ( ) are unadjusted
figures. Because of the primary/middle school division Ghana 
has a shorter primary cycle than most SSA countries.
f) Estimate for this study on basis fragmentary data.
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Poverty and Productivity: Continuity and Change
Sub-Saharan Africa has always been poor. The basic cause of poverty has been 
low productivity (however and by whomsoever caused or defined). The only way 
to overcome poverty (in a human sense relevant to a majority of poor people) 
has been to enable them to produce more. These realities pre-date the arrival 
of the Europeans, the slave trade and pre-colonial neo-colonialism and remain 
veridical in states which are not merely post-colonial but also in will and in 
significant ways in fact post neo-colonial. To talk about ending poverty in 
Africa primarily by consumption transfer payments is to talk nonsense - on 
outputs of $150 - $500 per capita it cannot be done. But equally to talk
about ending poverty without enabling the poor to produce more as well as
receive basic services and fair payment for what they produce, no matter how 
well intentioned the 3tate nor how much it tries to raise access to services 
and to modern sector wage employment is to talk about the unreal, that route 
too is "no through road” (as the example of Botswana - which has tried, in 
good faith, with relatively large resource allocations, under conditions • 
unusually favourable to this effort - demonstrates by its successes and their 
built-in limitations as well as by the continuing failures writ large in both 
income distribution and child malnutrition as well as in employment).
However, 1985 is not 1965 (even if in some cases - not by any means all - one 
might wish it were even in a static sense and much more because it would 
’redeem' twenty years "largely wasted” for a new, different and - perhaps - 
less profoundly unsatisfactory history to be written). There are changes in 
the nature, distribution and immediate causes of poverty.
To analyse at this level is to abstract - the international economic
environment and its evolution are taken as given. At one level that is
profoundly false. Until the late 1970s a majority of SSA economies - and a 
majority of human beings in some of that majority - were moving forward in 
overall and average producitivty terms and in access to basic services. The 
prime reason that is no longer true is the result of a harsher external 
economic environment (compounded by a worsened weather cycle) since 1968 and 
especially since 1978. Without changes for the better in that environment any 
assault upon unemployment and poverty in most of sub-Saharan Africa will be a 
process painfully long and slow in showing results (with all but a few of the 
present poor dead long before they could benefit) and in many cases literally
Sisyphean (the rock rolled up to within sight of the plateau will with a 
slight mistake, a drought, a commodity price collapse roll back down crashing 
and crushing all in its path). That should be taken as a given and taken into 
account in overall perspectives and proposals.
It is not analysed in depth here for four reasons:
1. to do so would require separate papers (some of which the present author
has written elsewhere);
2. many of Africa's problems are internal and not inherent consequences of 
the post 1969 world economic loss of forward momentum;
3. Africa is not the pivot nor the lever on which or by which the world 
economy will be moved and thus in a global (not an African) sense is
somewhat peripheral - even if integral - to any overall designing of
pivots, levers and hands to place the one and press the other;
4. unless changes internal to Africa are achieved by Africans no conceivable 
world economic recovery will more than ameliorate the absolute poverty of 
many of Africa's human beings. To understand that is no justification 
for non-Africans to 3tand by with folded hands (in prayer or behind the 
back, safely out of range of pockets), pursed lips or averted eyes. But 
it is probably a precondition to African efforts which can be supported 
with much faith in their enduring success or meaningful involvement with 
(as opposed to casting crumbs and casting off clothing to) Africans as
external junior partners in a common endeavour.
In 1965 sub-Saharan Africa had food shortages: there were hungry seasons
before harvest (and after stocks ran low) in many mono-seasonal, low rainfall 
zones; poor people were frequently hungry; overall nutrition levels measured 
by average calorie availability (and still more when disaggregation on the 
basis of household income and size was possible) were below standard
acceptable levels; severe drought and flood related localised famines were 
recurrent. But physical food shortages in the sense of unmet effective demand 
with money chasing absent food (as food prices shot up) were uncommon;
national food balances in most countries were approximately in balance (with 
most net importers having the foreign exchange to do so in most years);
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drought/disaster relief, even if unevenly and imperfectly, was able to avert 
hoardes of migrants and huddles of starving human beings. The television 
images of 1984-1985 were not absent simply because television was less far 
flung - so were the realities the images reflect.
Over 1965-1985 the trend growth of agricultural production has been perhaps 
2%, of domestic food perhaps 2.25Í and of non-food (domestic industrial and 
export) crops at most 1$ a year versus 2.75 to 3% overall, 6 to 7% urban and 
2% rural population growth. In other words average food production per capita 
is 25% below what it was two decades ago and that per agriculturally employed 
household about the same.
Small wonder that food prices have in general risen faster than other basic 
cost of living items or that - given output trends - small farmers have not 
benefitted, indeed have lost ground as their non-food crop cash incomes have 
in real terms declined from per capita volume falls and lower real unit prices 
largely enforced by world price movements even if exacerbated in some cases by * 
domestic policies (or the fiscal advice of the World 3ank and IMF in the 
extreme cases of 1983-85 Ghana and 1982-85 Uganda).
Squally unsurprising is the rise of endemic malnutrition and epidemic famine. 
Falling per capita availability ensures the former and by cutting down 
household and national safety margins paves the way for the latter whenever 
weather (or import capacity) suffers from an external shock. And external 
shocks have come thicker and faster since 1970 than over the previous decade 
and a half. The weather has on average been worse in the Sahel and the 
Savannah zones of West Africa, in the Horn and the Sudan, in Kenya and 
Southern Africa - whether cyclically or secularly is still open to doubt (or 
hope). The international economic environment has reverted to that of the 
1930s and 1940s rather than the - in retrospect unusually favourable no matter 
how relative that may have been - one of the latter 1950s, 1960s and 1975-78. 
Whatever disaster support mechanisms - household or state - had been built up 
were both frayed from inadequate maintenance and hit with ever heavier and 
more frequent loads to bear. What television has beamed around the world is 
the final, most acute stage of this sequence.
Rural poverty has increased. The number and proportion of rural households in 
absolute poverty has - at least since 1979 - risen. The slow rise in rural
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access to basic services has been reversed (in quality and effectiveness and 
increasingly often even in raw quantitative terms) as has the fall in child 
malnutrition and - less clearly as yet but even more ominously - those in 
infant and child mortality. The answer UNICEF’s poster puts to its query 
above the face of an African child ”What do you want to be when you grow up?” 
- ’Alive.” is a reflection of the necessary nature of priorities and immediate 
concerns in poor rural and urban households in most of Africa today and is a 
reflection of how lack of meaningful employment differs in degree and kind of 
impact between rural (and increasingly urban) Africa and even the mo3t 
deprived inner city ghettos of Western Europe or the USA.
The basic problem is increasingly one of productivity. Until poor rural 
households can produce more, no juggling of their incomes relative to those of 
poor urban workers (or even less poor ones) will solve national nor rural food 
balances. And nor will there be any lasting solution to poor rural household 
(basic self provisioning and cash income requirements) national (foreign 
exchange and fiscal) expenditure capacity and requirements balances which do 
not amputate the latter to ’fit’ the former. To characterise the underlying 
problem as exploitation or inequity is at one level true but also misleading 
since it is not primarily at the level normally understood by users of those
terms. The key problems seem to be:
1. lack of tools (the widespread reversion to wooden hoes is a forceful 
illustration of return to traditional but hardly appropriate or
productive technologies) and inputs (e.g. seed) poor farmers need to
produce more;
2. a similar lack of knowledge on how they could produce more, whether it 
would be financially viable for them to do so (and under what conditions) 
or whether the proposed techniques are ”user friendly” for peasants (and 
especially women) relating not so much to the scale but the quality, 
targeting and productivity (or rather its absence) of most agricultural 
research units;
3. combined with a similar lack of knowledge (and or resource backing) for 
productivity enhancing cost efficient programmes in respect to basic 
health care, education and access to pure (or any) water and to fuel. 
The malnourished, the ill, the illiterate, the (notably women and girls)
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exhausted from up to eight hours a day (on average perhaps four) of 
wooding and watering are not able to work harder, longer, more 
’intelligently*; to adopt new methods (especially if these entail risks 
and thus imperil the tenuous handhold on survivial - the dead do not 
benefit from subsequent ’average year” gains nor do those whose 3eed 
stock and ability to buy tools and clothes and medical care are wiped out 
in a first "atypical year”); to respond to campaigns to improve 
sanitation by digging safe pit latrines (much less buying concrete for 
slabs and pipes for venting) no matter how carefully and appropriately 
designed the applied technology or how culturally adapted the promotion 
(and often they are neither);
4. and exacerbated by an economically misguided and distributionally 
disastrous pumping of funds into mechanised large farms whose output 
levels, costs and even foreign exchange implications are disastrously 
poor compared to those of small farmer oriented programmes and into 
shoring up expensive, limited access fragments of the "lost kingdom" of 
modern services (e.g. in one West African country 80$ of the health 
budget for a region of 1,000,000 people goes on inadequate maintenance, 
non living wages of staff and almost invisible food and drug supply to 
the hulk of what was the regional hospital which could if fully 
operational serve perhaps 75,000 of them while in primary health care 
posts the ’lucky' ones covered by it make do almost entirely on the 
"supplementary" basic drug kits of a small international agency);
5. and in some - not infrequent and by definition too many - cases 
underpinned by a faith in the inadequacy and conservatism and inherent 
productive irrelevance of the small farmer expressed variously: "we will 
never be able to buy substantial staple food supplies from small 
farmers"; "the chief obstacle to rural development is the peasant"; "they 
are hungry and poor because they are lazy" - sentiments which when acted 
on do enforce self fulfillment by the peasant farmer and which the 
Ecumenical Movement should realise are not uncommon among responsible, 
resepctable Christians (Africans as well as expatriates) not necessarily 
excluding even church leaders and delegates to Vancouver. Colonial in 
origin these prejudices may be (traditionally agriculture was an 
honourable - if not always very much rewarded or desired for oneself - 
occupation im most African cultures) but up to a quarter century after
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independence, far from being bit by bit put in the rubbish bin of
misguided importations along with street names and statues of conquerers, 
they are in danger of becoming the new tradition.
These forms of exclusion and inequity interact with more nakedly exploitative 
ones and with ones which prejudice many small peasants whether they benefit 
anyone else or not. Access to decent land with access to transport (and 
buyers) is increasingly scarce whatever the average land/person ratio. And 
whatever el3e they may be and however different in other ways most African 
traditional land tenure systems and standard Western freehold tenure in
situations of land scarcity are biased against the poor, against the newcomer 
(whether migrant or local labour force entering youth) and against women. So 
too - with very rare exceptions - are public, co-operative and private
channels for distributing anything scarce (from yellow fever shots to having 
ones crop bought, from primary school places to hoes and cutlasses, from
credit for input purchase to servicing a broken water system). This is not 
always with any exploitative intent: travelling on very bad roads to small and * 
uncertain sources of supply is not sound business if larger, 3urer, more
numerous sources on less bad routes will fill a wholesaler/transporter’s whole 
lorry fleet; it is harder to relate to 3,000 odd dispensaries and clinics than 
to 100 hospitals; an enemployed, underfed, massed urban proletariat (and one 
which is often desperate and objectively fully justified in its desperation) 
is more threatening than quietly, invisibly dying infants and prematurely 
aging and dying peasants four hundred miles away in a region perhaps five per 
cent of decision takers and senior technocrats have ever visited. But
whatever the causes, whether anyone benefits or not, the objective reality for 
the rural poor is one of exclusion and oppression to a degree making it
impossible for growing numbers to sustain, let alone raise, their
productivity.
And In The Cities "Paved With Gold”
The urban poor of Africa are not a new phenomenon of the 1980s. The inner 
slums and ex-urban ndecantment” areas (when inner slums were upgraded out of 
their residents means) have been there and growing for at least four decades.
But there are changes quantitatively and qualitatively and not for the better.
The dumping grounds - within and without formal city limits - are much larger 
(at least in numbers consigned and confined to them if not always in 
hectarage) absolutely and relative to both national and non-rural population. 
In 1976 it was possible (albeit probably already out of date) to argue that 
under a tenth of sub-Saharan Africa's absolutely poor lived in urban areas. 
That is no longer a plausible claim and even if it were, clusters of 80,000 to 
250,000 souls in abject poverty - in many respects worse than any rural slum 
except a camp of starving refugees from drought and/or "social disorder" (an 
antiseptic catch-all phrase covering South Afrian aggression, the brutal 
oppression of an Amin or an Ngwema, the continuing Imperial Will to enfore its 
edicts on the "outlands" in Ethiopia, the anarchic civil wars of the Tchod, 
the - varied causally and symptomatically but uniform in imposing costs - 
partial or total disintegration of services and even the state in numerous 
politics) - matter even if they constitute only 10 to 20$ of all human beings 
in a country living in absolute poverty.
For the urban poor 1985 is much worse than 1965 or 1975. Real food price 
increases have done the majority of small peasant households no good - they 
have done poor urban ones immense harm. Real access to services in low income 
urban areas was better (less bad) than in rural, but in 3ome four times the 
1965 population have access to almost the same number of water point and aqua 
privies - indeed basically the same ones and much the worse for wear and 
non-maintenance - and so little access to public primary school places that 
private schools are mushrooming when typical household incomes are one quarter 
the level an international agency's experts thought barely adequate to buy a 
minimum, nutritionally sound diet.
Minimum wages - and the lower typical "informal" urban sector incomes - are 
now in many countries no longer above typical (excluding the top 10$ and 
bottom 30$) peasant household incomes from agriculture if self provisioning of 
food and shelter is valued at urban retail prices. That is not true only in 
countries like Tanzania where lesser urban/rural inequality has been not 
merely a goal but one backed (admittedly not always very wisely and often even 
less successfully) with a massive pro-rural policy and (in contrast to 
sources) resource allocation bias. It is also true of polities like Ghana 
which can hardly be accused of (or praised for) any such policy or resource 
pattern nor, indeed, have adumbrated and consistent goals on the issue. 
Unfortunately this is for the wrong reason - the urban poor have been getting
- 14 -
poorer faster than the rural poor. "Achieving" typical peasant household 
incomes up to 150$ of the urban minimum wage (as both Tanzania and Ghana 3eem 
to have done) is not of much comfort to peasant households when neither can 
lift the household out of absolute poverty and access to basic services is 
deteriorating in qualitative and sometimes quantitative terms for both 
(clearly both in Ghana though on balance not quantitatively and less rapidly 
qualitatively in Tanzania).
The foundation reason is once again inadequate productivity in or of 
employment. Even with collapsing real wages, modern sector wage employment is 
at or below late 1970s highs in a majority of SSA economies whereas overall 
population is 25 to 33$ (and urban sometimes over 50$) higher. In most a 
modern sector wage growth as fast as population would require 5$ to 9$ annual 
real output growth whereas plausible ’optimistic’ estimates range from 1$ to 
5.5$.
The exhaustion of the "rural sponge" (i.e. more households with less * 
complementary resources crowding onto less and on average worse land per 
household with few technical or other changes capable of lifting productivity) 
and the stagnation of the formal job market make the "informal" urban sector 
the most rapidly expanding source of employment. As its basic customers have 
falling incomes and technical changes, while real, are limited this too means 
dividing a slowly growing total real output among a rapidly growing number of 
households dependent on it. There are now only too self evidently many more 
women and men selling cloth and garments in Accra’s main markets than in 1965
but, with the national consumption of cloth and garments down, the impression
that they look shabbier and more worried than in 1965 is likely to be an
equally valid if even less documented one.
Doubtless the informal sector averts starvation, but not absolute proverty. 
Doubtless it uses "appropriate” technology - i.e. makes do with bits and 
pieces even usually at the cost of low and on average declining productivity 
because for most of the human beings trapped in i,t there are no less bad 
options known and accessible to them. To praise its "resilience" and 
"vitality” is in one sense proper - much of the modern sector has done worse; 
to survive and to remain human in such a context is an achievement. But on 
the lips of affluent experts, however intentioned, these phrases ring
uncertainly or worse. - Would they accept to be "vital" and "resilient" in
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these ways? Have they - the onetime prophets of the modern sector
institutions they now pour scorn upon - nothing better to offer? - Is their 
praise a rationalisation for leaving 'well enough’ alone and turning back to 
macro economic abstractions and modern sector specifics that interest them 
more, and pay them better in cash, in status and in reputation?
The assertion of the strength of traditional social systems is equally
ambiguous. It is partly true. But increasing numbers of urban (and even some 
rural) Africans have fallen beyond any kinship support system; but when all 
boats sink lower (to invert Chairman Mao's statement of the desirable course 
of economic change) support networks weaken (less resources, more demands, 
more "opting out" to limit the falls in their own effective incomes); but some 
neo-traditional revivals - e.g. "child pawning" in West Africa with 5 to 8 
year olds selling in the markets, acting as organised begging troupes,
cleaning and tending shops - and one suppposes workshops - (none of which are 
traditional in the literal sense) because parents must repay debts or 
disengage a mouth (apparently usually female) from the household pot - are * 
damnable by any decent human test, including traditional African ones. To 
understand why these things are happening or to see that they may avert worse, 
e.g. child abandonment and/or infanticide which seem less rapidly growing in 
West Africa where "child pawning" seems to be commoner, is one thing; to 
accept, let alone approve, is another. In this case "after such knowledge 
what forgiveness" if one simply turns to the next topic seems a better guide
than "to know all is to forgive all".
However, these shifts do have one very clear implication. Whatever was true
in 1965, it is no longer generally humanly or productively plausible to try to
fund real rural producer price or service increases by cutting real urban 
wages and services levels.
At Least We Know What Is Wrong And What To Do
The new conventional wisdom on Africa claims to have identified the mistakes 
of the past and to have cures for them. (At least it did so claim in 1981; in
fairness the blatant, brassy certainty has faded somewhat and a number of
trumpets sound more uncertainly.) Certainly it has picked out a number - 
sometimes all - of the points made above. There are however five buts:
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many of the criticisms were made almost as cogently (if less urgently 
than would seem prudent in retrospect and with less sense of how near the 
slippery slope was and how far down it went than is evident in 1985) by 
African and other critics from the early 1960s onward but a majority of 
the survivors of that criticism do not see the new conventional wisdom as 
their intellectual progeny (except perhaps as a Frankenstein monster);
many of the most assured agents of the new conventional wisdom should in 
one sense know what is wrong with the present - collectively they were 
(for whatever reasons and with no matter how good intentions) its
dominant architects as the World Bank is unusual not in only a quarter 
admitting but in neither denying nor totally brushing out of sight (the 
surviving critics of the 1960s and 1970s to be fair are not always much 
more candid in analysing their own mistakes - to have played or half 
played Cassandra gives some claim to intellectual integrity but little to 
positive achievement or of ability to convey what one feared one knew);
the new conventional wisdom in many respects is not so new - more free 
markets, more primary export crops, more encouragement to private
investment, higher price incentives, lower public expenditure especially 
on basic services and the poor (few conventional wisdom advocates choose 
to put their main budget cutting thrust on pure administration or
military/police spending), sectoral programmes and projects whose import 
intensity and average technology levels are not in practice all that much 
lower (even if different in makeup) than those which proved unsustainable 
are at its core and these - whatever the rhetoric - have been the common 
currency of most external advice (especially that backed by funding) and 
most of the spending of most African governments (and their colonial 
predecessors) for fourty years;
the strategic approach is remarkably broad brush, remarkably little
concerned with massive national and regional differences (as if Calabria 
and the "stockbroker belt" of Kent - Surrey - Sussex, Stockholm's suburbs 
and Amsterdam's ghettos were seen as basically the same with only trivial 
differences in detail) and intensely resistant to operational and 
practical as well as normative criticisms of even the most outre of the 
specific detailed prescriptions deduced from the most sweeping general
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hypotheses (one is tempted to say asserted revealed truths) e.g. revenue 
measures whose administrative requirements and high cost to revenue 
ratios would horrify almost any experienced "Treasury hand" whatever his 
views on their social and distributional impact or calls for charging 
full cost for vaccines against fatal epidemic diseases which may appear 
to be almost as lamentable macro economics or cost benefit analysis as 
they are socially and humanly objectionable;
5. the whole of the new conventional wisdom is production and macro economic 
centred often to the nearly total exclusion of distribution and human 
welfare (or illfare for the excluded) considerations. One is tempted to 
describe it as economystic as well as economistic and to charge it with
neglect of a basic economic (as well as human truth) one of the
intellectuals it likes to claim as a progenitor - Adam Smith - 3aw, and 
in The Wealth of Nations stressed very clearly, that no nation can be
great and prosperous, the majority of whose people are poor and 
miserable. Adam Smith indeed did not advocate consumption transfer . 
payments - he perceived 18th Century England as too poor to make them 
more than a poultice which in general terms is a considerably stronger 
argument against viewing them as a general solution for sub-Saharan 
Africa in the late 20th Century. He did advocate making it possible for 
the poor to be more productive and to be paid more fairly. That his 
model of a truly equal opportunity competitive market had never existed 
(as he makes very plain in arguing it should) and was in fact becoming 
ever less attainable (as is only too clear in retrospect) is fair 
criticism; to claim him (or even David Ricardo) as a legitimator of
treating production apart from distsribution (i.e. production by whom, 
how, for what reward) and for treating economics as separate from "moral 
philosophy" (i.e value judgements) is intellectual obtuseness or 
falsification and, however intended, the highroad to justifying moral 
insensitivity and human unconcern. Marx once thanked God he was not a 
Marxian, no thoughtful reader of the Wealth of Nations can easily suppose 
Smith's judgement on Von Mises or Friedman or Von Hayek would be 
dissimilar.
In terms of sub-Saharan Africa, it can be asserted that the new conventional 
wisdom does at least stress the small farmer as the only means of salvation 
rather than the chief obstacle to progress. In principle so it does. But its
- 18-
small African farmer is a curious abstraction with curious priorities and 
calls for his (not her) participation are not based on any real attempt to 
inform itself on small farmer priorities but on the wisdom's revealed truth as 
to what they should (and therefore, in the absence of "false consciousness", 
must) want.
In the first place there are more qualifications about the small farmer than 
about most other tenets. One is not always - sometimes something or somebody 
else will be appropriate. Another is not all, only small farmers with above
average present performance or location or access to complementary resources 
or some other reason for attracting the favourable view of an extension
officer (i.e., back to the "progressive farmer" late colonial syndrome) which
will usually exclude 95% of the poorest 50% of small farmers on one count or 
another. In the second place the small farmer is viewed almost as if he (as 
noted not she in this context) were a model corporation not a person or a head 
of household and one able to operate on certain, long term caluclations as to 
risk and with ability to accept front-end loaded (i.e. early year) risk.
Third, while lessening, there is still over-emphasis on macro economic 
variables or simplicities, e.g. higher prices as not only necessary (which may 
often be true but in real terms is equally often impossible) but sufficient 
(which is rarely true) to generate rapid output increases. Fourth, there is a 
grudging but growing acceptance that new, lower cost means of providing basic 
services are important but apparently almost wholly on the basis that the ill 
cannot work hard nor the illiterate learn new ways of doing things and that 
broad basic coverage pays better (on empirical models) than limited access 
narrow coverage, a view which still seems to ignore that there may just be a 
normative difference between a human being and a cow or a hoe or a bolt of 
cloth or a barn which is (and ought to be) relevant to economic policy.
Oddly enough until very recently even this degree of insight into urban 
workers was lacking. Real wage and salary cuts were standard advice partly to 
increase rural relative to urban incentives, partly to reduce costs relative 
to competing imports or to export competitors and partly to reduce budget 
deficits. The fact that the urban worker also responds to economic incentives 
(disincentives) and if paid much less than a subsistence wage with further 
real cuts predictable, will both be neither well nourished and healthy enough 
to work a full day and be directing his motivation to finding additional 
sources of income which at the best will reduce time and attention to - and
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productivity of - that worker's main job rarely surfaced. As the loss - 
physically or effectively - of senior personnel became ever more acute, 
concern for a salary adequate to command competence and diligence began to 
surface followed recently - at least in a few cases - by a similar concern 
about wages. 3ut even here the prescription is either narrowly focused or 
economistic - fire half the employees (especially at the bottom) and raise 
real pay 25 to 50Í (especially at the top) with the savings to reduce 
borrowing (state) or enhance investment (private). This may in specific cases 
be eminently sound micro economic advice but unless some attention is given to 
what the 50% dismissed will do (and to the short term cost budget if they are 
given significant severance pay as, to be fair, the World Bank for one 
advocates), the completeness of the prescription is open to doubt. Firing 
modern sector wage earners may indeed make that sector leaner and healthier 
but by itself seems unlikely to give those fired any general access to any 
opportunity other than to become very lean indeed. Employment is not one of 
the goals of the new conventional wisdom - full employment however defined, 
appears to be implicitly at least excluded from the sphere of topics sensible, * 
pragmatic economic analysts or decision takers would spend time analysing much 
less resources seeking to attain.
To put it bluntly: Yes, we know at several levels what has gone wrong in
sub-Saharan Africa and some of the causes. We also know some things to avoid
and a number it would be desirable to do. At a more basic level there is
basic disagreement on what the strategic causes of failure were or are and, 
therefore, at the least on the necessary and sufficient conditions of halting 
decline and even more of attaining sustainable reversals. There is almost 
equal disagreement on why certain elements of failure are general in direction 
- if less so in degree - across what appear to be very different economies and 
politics in opportunities, policies and priority resource allocations and how 
much discernible regional, national and sub-national divergencies really do 
matter, how and why. There is a gulf - not to say a chasm - between zealots
(not all conventional wisdom advocates by any means) who prefer to have
simple, operational turnpike models to the new Africa and the sad sceptics (by 
no means all cynics) who assert (with the present author) that there are no 
simple, generally applicable, adequately explanatory models on offer except 
patently incomplete and almost certainly wrong ones.
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What Now? Or Whence From Here?
A station master at Aberdeen one evening supposedly told an inquiring would-be 
passenger for Aberystwyth that he would advise starting from somewhere else at 
a different time. Any humanly (and almost any economically) concerned analyst 
of sub-Saharan Africa today has good reason to share his feelings. But Africa 
and Africans are in the Africa of 1985 and have no alternative starting place 
or time. Nor is advice to wait until things are clearer very apposite when 
deterioration is more common than stabilisation or recovery and when human 
misery and human deaths are rising.
Three basic propositions appear to be valid:
First, production matters. Without more production productive employment in 
Africa cannot be adequate in quantity or quality no matter how fairly rewards 
for work are distributed nor how much is attempted in the way of
redistribution to the poor.
Second, distribution matters and should not be viewed as separate from 
production. Who produces what, how, under what conditions and how much
largely determines both household and state income. The former distribution
determines whether people (especially poor people) will have enough food,
clothing, housing. The latter determines whether there will be the resources 
to provide (or move toward) universal access to basic services and at least a 
minimum disaster protection (e.g. finance relief) structure.
Third, employment matters. Its productivity and fairness of remuneration - and 
above all its availability - basically determine who and how many can escape 
from or remain out of absolute poverty and who are held in or dumped into it. 
Realistically - especially in SSA today - consumption transfers after initial 
distribution can do little to alter the initial pattern except at the pure
survival level. However, that is not the only reason employment matters:
a. employment is a basic form of participation - because economic life is
important ability to participate in it is equally important;
b. participation in production is a basic source of power - who does not
produce anything critical to the economy or polity is objectively
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dispensable and any entitlements she/he has to income and services are
always at risk;
c. employment is important to self respect and 3elf definition. What a 
person does, the nature of relationships with others and how that doing 
and those relationships are seen by the person are a very large part of 
any human being's total reality and employment/self 
employment/unemployment are quantitatively and qualitatively a very large 
element of doing, relating, perceiving;
d. similarly employment (including future employment for the young and past 
employment for the aged) i3 a critical element in status, i.e. how a 
person is perceived and related with by others. Unemployment and
manifestly low productivity or unfairly rewarded employment erode status 
as well as self respect. Respect for the aged is usually differentiated 
by what they did and attitudes to children conditioned in part by their 
perceived employment roles and prospects.
The last two considerations are sometimes advanced rather hesitantly as being 
perhaps Eurocentric rather than general. At least in respect to SSA they 
appear to be generally more significant than (if not always in the same forms
as) in Europe or North America. Status and self perception turn primarily on
what a person does (or did for the aged or is likely to do for children) and 
how well it is done. The ranking of what is not strictly economically linked 
(any more than in Europe) but low productivity and low rewards (whether from 
low productivity or systemic unfairness) usually result in a low ranking of 
that type of employment in status as well as in desire to engage in it.
What Is To Be Done
There is clearly not space here for a complete set of employment strategies, 
progammes and policies for 250 odd rural and urban contexts in 46 independent 
sub-Saharan African countries. Nor would such an exercise be very appropriate 
for the work of AGEM nor very appropriate as a virtuoso exercise by a 
non-poor, non-unemployed (and hopefully non-unproductive) non-African who - 
even more critical - has no claim to knowing the specificities of more than a 
handful of those contexts.
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Generalisations on the other hand always run the risk of chopping and 
stretching each specific case so that they give some overall illumination but 
are precisely inadequate as operating lights for any one case. At that ri3k a 
few observations or guidelines may be useful. There are four broad groups or 
clusters of productive employment in SSA:
a. agricultural 3elf employment
b. other "informal" sector self employment
c. '’informal1' sector wage employment
d. "modern" sector wage employment.
In respect to agricultural self employment a number of strategic and policy 
requirements can be identified. Concentation on empowering the small farmers 
to produce more and to be more adequately rewarded for it is central. It 
involves more attention to knowledge creation and entension, input supply, 
availability of accessible buyers paying reasonable fair prices promptly and 
of sellers with similarly priced and located goods to buy, attention to actual 
farmer concerns, capabilities, methods of production, support for (not to be 
confused with "smother love" for or manipulation of) small farmer 
organisations for self organisation, self help, self servicing and self 
representation. Realistically this must be the major source of new productive 
employment in Africa over the foreseeable future (i.e. at least until 2005); 
not because it is an easy route but because there are no identifiable 
alternatives.
Other small scale self employment (the distinction made here is 
agricultural/non-agricultural not rural/urban) poses more problems in 
identifying plausible strategies. Given the large present size of the sector 
and the near inevitability of its growing over the next two decades, such 
identification is urgent. Urgency is reinforced by the fact that in many 
rural areas the most logical routes to raise household productivity include 
increasing the number of days on which 'economic' activity is possible by 
adding non-agricultural production during the off season. More policy 
oriented analysis of and reflection on the sector and its components and 
contexts is needed before this can be done. Preliminary points include 
removing regulations which - to no great social gain - impede small busines; 
improving market access (e.g. in ways of handling public institutional 
purchases) and access to inputs (e.g. via semi-specialised wholesale firms
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giving credit to their customers); providing an analogue to agricultural 
extension (often tried but usually for the top size end of this sector and 
with very mixed results).
"Informal” sector wage employment's expansion and remuneration depend on two 
basic factors: how fast the sector’s productive employment opportunities can 
expand and what market, organisational or other safeguards exist that 
employees will be fairly remunerated, i.e. what constraints there are on
exploiting employees. The former relates to the same issues as self 
employment in the sector (including overall demand growth). The degree of
exploitation depends on: a.) how rapidly overall productive employment is
growing (i.e. reducing the pressure of many workers chasing few jobs); b.) how 
much organisation of informal sector employees is feasible (usually low); c.) 
how much social pressures limit gross exploitation (uneven but often low and 
declining); d.) whether informal sector enterprises are able to secure fair 
prices or are themselves grossly exploited (varies widely); and e.) what the 
state can do via structures like Wages Councils and inspections (limited but 
not negligible especially if reinforced by "a” and "b" or "c").
"Modern" (i.e. recorded medium and large scale) wage employment growth (and 
recovery of real wages) is important. This is partly because it is an
important share of total employment in at least some countries and partly 
because a moderately buoyant formal sector employment market seems to have 
some pull effect on informal sector earnings (partly by reducing labour 
vulnerability to exploitation and partly by increasing the market for the 
informal sector’s goods and services). However, the most critical reason is 
that in the medium and long term it is not possible to raise productive self 
employment in agriculture rapidly enough to provide for 60 - 70% of new labour 
force entrants. Equally adequately productive and remunerated informal sector 
employment - as opposed to low productivity/low remuneration residual 
employment - is unlikely to grow rapidly except in parallel with formal wage 
employment. Therefore, by 1995 wage employment on standard international 
definitions needs to be increasing at a faster rate than the labour force. 
How to achieve this is much less than clear - even 6% growth rates of GDP on 
present wage employment structures and productivity trends would yield 1 to 3Í 
wage employment growth trends. Increasing productivity of labour would, in 
the medium term, help - African wage labour was often relatively high cost 
even before low capacity utilisation ratios raised costs further because oí
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levels of education, training and experience. (In the medium term, because 
until production growth can be raised, higher productivity growth means lower 
employment growth.) Second, restructuring production with higher basic goods 
and services components may increase the employment/output ratio. For goods, 
this is very much may - mass market textiles do have very significant 
economies of scale up to 20 million square metres and the technology is not 
very labour intensive; fertiliser production is inherently capital intensive. 
For services the case is clearer - primary education and primary health care, 
for example, are labour intensive. Third, some economic activities can be 
restructured to be more labour (and less capital) intensive with positive or 
modest negative cost implications. Selectivity is needed - whether a product 
or service is a sound candidate is a contextual and empirical question. 
Manufacturing proper is not the most promising candidate albeit it is true 
that small, labour intensive "artisanal” industries (from garments through 
light engineering) have an unduly small share in most SSA manufacturing 
sectors. Construction and goods handling (packing, warehousing, loading) are 
more likely general areas for labour using, import and capital saving 
technology shifts at low cost increases (or even savings). However, designing 
such shifts requires serious attention. E.g. labour intensive road and 
highway construction on maintenance saves on imported equipment, is neutral or 
saving in respect to professional personnel, can be local input demand raising 
and import requirement reducing and may lower costs; but it requires longer 
forward planning and construction time, more training of workers and more 
semi-skilled/skilled (foremen, artisans) personnel to be effective in getting 
the job done.
Challenge And Response
The challenge to look again at employment (and people) as central and at 
productivity (and production) as a means is not one particularly welcome to 
holders of economic, political and intellectual power. The opposition to it 
in extreme cases can take the form of violence leading to martyrdom but that 
is not the common road. Very standard responses include:
a. concealment and
b. not wanting to know
#
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Followed by assertions employment/distribution concerns
c. create disincentives
d. cannot be afforded (at home or globally).
One case of concealment illustrates the depth of the problem because it arose 
in a state which has tried - with some success - to make possible higher small 
farmer productivity, extend basic services, limit cuts to real minimum wages, 
provide food for work employment to use drought idled labour time to 
strengthen the community and small farmer base against the next drought.
Two years ago that country was in severe problems with the IMF on budgetary 
overruns. These were largely drought, basic services, production support and 
(genuine) external security related. Some tens of thousands of refugees from 
a neighbour afflicted with a drought and manipulated insurgency/banditry 
situation which had led to famine, fled to the country’s border area. For 
some months not simply was there no government programme, but no government 
effort to mobilise others to act, no permission for publicity, a nearly total 
veil of silence. Clearly decision takers felt they had no money and that to 
publicise another relief need would endanger their international financial
negotiations with severe negative implications for their own poor.
The non-government response was different. Extended kin (themselves drought 
hit) helped first. Next local communities including local government and 
churches. By then the situation was becoming nationally known - and to be 
fair stories were not suppressed. Voluntary organisations, churches, workers 
and enterprises, began to mobilise resources to help. The government position 
shifted; a.) it looked with favour on local and national voluntary efforts;
b.) it set out to mobilise agency and NGO support for international assistance 
to the refugees.
Not wanting to know is also common. A hard pressed government genuinely
seeking to restore production, genuinely short of resources, all too well
aware its decisions have alienated significant interests and sub-classes at 
home and abroad does not want to see data like those set out in the table to 
this paper. This is likely to be true however sincere and concerned it is - 
evidence of failure to do enough when real efforts are being made and
resources seem stretched to the limit is never very welcome.
«
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Ho w to overcome this willed or semi-willed ignorance must depend on the nature 
of the holders of power. To the extent they have an interest (for whatever 
reason) in broad support and broad welfare five lines of persuasion exist:
1. the human deprivation is real and either growing or at the best remaining 
at very high levels;
2. stabilisation and adjustment that result in macro-economic recovery but 
increasing human misery are analagous to the successful operation whose 
patience, inconveniently, dies;
3. such an adjustment process is at risk for two reasons - the misery saps 
ability to raise productivity and it builds up demand for reversal of the 
policies parallel to (or because of) which it has grown;
4. among those most at risk are the political decison takers, technocrats and 
intellectual architects of the policy (at any rate the citizen ones);
5. people (and often domestic and external funding sources) are willing to 
organise to deal with the human misery issues - certainly by self help, 
preferable in cooperation with the state - and do intend to achieve 
results.
Once the reality of the employment gap is admitted, together with at least 
some of its implications, one line of resistance is likely to be that changes 
would create disincentives. The Northern form is that "high" unemployment 
compensation and family support "benefits" encourage unemployment. One 
African variant is that "good" (i.e. living) wages and security of employment 
encourages laziness.
The evidence for such propositions is rather scanty. What exists suggests 
that if one creates contexts in which there is no economic incentive to seek 
to be more productive, the results of work are not self evidently useful to 
anybody and the work itself is both uninteresting and organised in a rigid 
hierarchical way, then most human beings will indeed react to by trying to 
bend or beat the system because they view it as oppressive. Trying to reduce 
or remove the oppressive (and often economically irrational) elements would
t
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seem a more human, potentially more productive approach (and certainly one 
more in accord with the Gospel message) than trying to strip out what 
safeguards remain.
Economic disincentives do exist. (Some of course one approves - if they deter 
economic acts the viewer sees as immoral, undesirable or unsound.) When they 
deter higher production and equitable distribution they should be removed, 
unless there is a very strong case for them on other equity or production 
grounds.
What there is no case for doing is to concentrate only on measures or 
structures in some way safeguarding the poor’s employment or self employment 
incomes and to do so without reference either to the costs of change or to 
alternative protection (e.g. food relief in camps is a disincentive to staying 
on the farm to save and rebuild it; therefore prompt assistance - e.g. food 
for work, replacement seed - on or near the farm is more efficient in 
production as well as human welfare terms, whereas halting food in camps and 
driving people out are neither).
Cost is a genuine objection. Real resources are limited. Subsidies - 
especially consumption transfers - especially in SSA cannot be the main means 
of creating employment or ensuring that its income return is adequate whatever 
its productivity. But in fact most subsidies go to the not so poor as often 
do most of the costs of those subsidies which do benefit the poor. All 
programmes - whether centre city reference hospitals or rural clinics, support 
for mechanised farming or for hoe and cutlass production - cost real 
resources. The questions are of choice and formulation, efficiency and 
priorities and ultimately whether people (and among them which people) are 
seen primarily as the subjects and beneficiaries of, or as the objects and 
inputs into, production.
Just as the EEC states choose to support the Common Agricultual Policy (a 
remarkably cost ineffective way of supporting small farmer employment and 
incomes at home and in the cases of sugar, beef and grain a remarkably 
effective one for eroding those of farmers and farm workers in the Third 
World) so too many African states subsidise household connected piped water, 
higher volume household electricity consumption, upper income housing, 
mechanised agriculture, high quality/low access hospital care. These are
»
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choices that involve real resource use. In employment and income terms they 
are biased against the poor; in production terms they bias the mix of goods 
and services produced (and usually the incomes generated in producing them) to 
the rich and - in general (there are specific, context linked and limited, 
exceptions) have no claim to being efficient in direct production stimulation 
or indirect creation of incentive patterns. These choices are far more in 
need of exposure, scrutiny and alteration or reversal than those on general 
access, staple food subsidies to producers or consumers (ineffective and in 
need of redesign or substitution as many of the latter are in SSA). It is
perhaps prudent to warn that most such choices are not made in ignorance nor 
do they result fully from power and pressure external to the decision advisers 
and takers. The basic question here is the one in the trade union song "Which 
side are you on?".
What Is The Call To Churches?
If the Ecumenical Movement is to be committed to making access to productive 
and meaningful (adequate and adequately remunerated) employment a central 
political economic goal and one toward which progress is made then it,
Churches and Christians need to go well beyond simply analysing what is wrong 
and what action would be in the right direction. Neither the Ecumenical
Movement’s nor Churches’ great strength (comparative advantage) lies in 
designing detailed political economic programmmes and for Christians who are 
experts in these areas a context of Christian values and targeted concerns 
backed by informed critcism and solidarity is needed, not usually a religious 
institutional basis and still less a would-be theocratic economic system 
paradigm.
From intellectual discussion, the road leads to criticism, direct programmatic 
involvement, solidarity in support and involvement in policy dialogue. (It 
should lead via self examination and self criticism. Churches - especially in 
Africa - are not usually major employers or landlords but they are more than 
insignificant employers and in some cases holders of land. Their own 
practices often do require reflection - and amendment, e.g. why should 
churches in some countries seek to avoid paying the minimum wage to
messengers, cleaners, and other low skilled/low pay personnel? The legal 
ground that they are not profit making is usually impeccable but the
%
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consonance with "The labourer is worthy of his hire" might be thought much 
less self evident).
Many - probably almost all - sub-Saharan African churches are concerned about 
poverty, human misery, unemployment/unremunerative employment. Many 
Christians, especially in rural areas, are poor and are poor because they 
cannot produce more (are unproductively employed). But this concern does not 
seem to be focused on employment nor especially on broad structural policy
concerns, constraints and possibilities. Rather more reflection would appear 
appropriate on whether employment is central, what employment is, why it
matters, for whom it is crucial and how it might be furthered.
In addition, it must be recognised that most church leaders and central 
structures are non-poor and non-rural. The immediacy and tangibility of their 
understanding of employment concerns and needs in rural Africa and African 
urban slums is not always evident. Indeed sometimes one can detect echoes, or 
more, of the laziness, conservatism, ignorance, wasteful subsidy lines of
secular establishment insensitivity in their voices (which is perhaps less 
than surprising - many of the individuals articulating what are in practice 
and/or intent hard line anti-poor positions are practicing Christians).
Church social action (services) in SSA is usually health and education 
focused. A continuing strand - but usually a smaller one - is rural 
development (sometimes creative and radical, sometimes paternalistic and
ultra-conservative. A newer one - again usually smaller - is a range of 
creative experimental or pilot social projects (e.g. low cost accommodation 
for young working women from rural areas, urban women's craft production 
cooperatives, para psychological services). A sadly necessary recent growth 
area is supplementary feeding.
Except for some of the rural development and urban co-op work these are not 
directly employment directed. This may not be a mistaken choice - many of the 
services are critical in sustaining or developing ability to work 
productively; broad employment/productivity generation programmes are 
certainly not within Churches' financial capacity. But it seems to be a 
rather unexamined choice - the balance may well be too little pilot employment 
project oriented. In addition it must be admitted that - as with SSA as a 
whole - many of the services remain too externally dependent not only for
%
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funding but also for personnel.
Participation in public policy dialogue is a very uneven area, but in all 
candour cannot - especially, but not only, on employment - be termed a general 
strength of SSA churches.
Yes, the context is often unpropitious, i.e. open criticism is ignored, 
rejected or suppressed; free discussion or dialogue is either not accepted or 
accepted only in structures closed to Churches. Yes, many Churches and 
Christians have courage and have spoken out against abuses (albeit these have 
rarely turned on employment, at least as such). Uganda's martyred Archbishop 
Janani Luwum is an extreme case, but he is not alone in dying because he 
rebuked principalities and powers in the name of the Gospel message and less 
extreme cases of speaking truth knowing the consequences would include some 
degree of repression are not uncommon.
But... in countries with moderately open states, permitting some degree of 
criticism, genuinely concerned with the poor and their incomes, vaguely 
pro-religious bodies (and there are a number in Africa), the lack of creative 
interaction (including criticism and initiatives) is often deafening. In 
other cases the degree of stridency and negativism (interspersed with silence) 
in Church criticism whatever else can be said of it does not contribute to 
dialogue influencing particular strategies and programmes.
In any case a pre-condition for full dialogue is more thinking by the Churches 
about employment. That would include thinking through how approaches 
demonstrated viable in Church projects could be maintained and generalised 
(the latter at least probably involving a need for at least partial state 
funding and staffing in most of SSA). To enter into dialogue with no clear 
ideas on topics or goals is unlikely to be very useful - except to another 
party wishing to manipulate and use Churches as a cover or a chorus of 
praise-singers.
Mobilisation on economic matters - especially employment as such - by African 
Churches is uncommon. The exceptions all to often appear to be as a part of a 
middle class coalition defending rather specific middle class interests.
It can be argued that most Africans are not Christians and Churches (as noted
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above) are neither economic think tanks nor economic action groups and for 
both reasons Church leadership in mobilisation on economic issues is 
inappropriate as well as unlikely. There is something in both arguments but 
perhaps less than appears at first glance. In many African countries 
Christians are a plurality. Nor if the argument against action by Churches 
alone on economic mobilisation rests on respect for other faiths is it clear 
why joint discussion, suggestion mobilisation with Islamic and/or 
"traditional" faith bodies is not a more logical alternative than withdrawal. 
Equally Churches are in many African countries the best organised, largest 
voluntary organisations. Absolutely weak they may be, but in terms of mass 
membership, organisation, finance, personnel, ability to communicate and some 
degree of freedom from violent repression they are relatively strong. (The 
role of the Churches in the Namibian Liberation Struggle illustrates the 
latter point very clearly; admittedly not the former as 80 to 90Í of Namibians 
are Christians). The prophet who said "Here I am. Send me", and the apostle 
who located the (apparently quite inadequate) "5 loaves and 2 small fishes" 
may be examples for further reflection on economic mobilisation. It is again 
unclear why solidarity/joint action with peasants and worker organisations (if 
they exist) are not seen as the appropriate alternative to separate, 
specifically Church action.
Again, however, Church examination (including self examination of attitudes, 
actions and membership) is a pre-condition. One may be able to mobilise 
without knowing clearly about what, nor having any clear ideas as to for what, 
but that is more likely to be a highroad to manipulation, repression and 
future demobilisation than either to proclaiming the Gospel message’s 
relevance to economic justice, production and employment convincingly or to 
achieving real progress toward the labourer having access to a job and a fair 
reward for it.
These reflections, like the paper as a whole, are concentrated on independent 
sub-Saharan Africa and the Churches of SSA. Only they can (or should) take 
the leadership in Africa on Christian involvement with employment. Churches, 
Christians and the global Ecumenical Movement have a duty of solidarity (and 
perhaps, on occasion of criticism) and one of cooperation and of both 
receiving and offering counsel and suggestion but no duty and no right to seek 
to export programmes, priorities, personnel and leadership to Africa. Africa 
and Africans have suffered and still suffer from too much domination - whether
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overtly, by coercive ’advice' or by more subtle methods - from outsiders (not 
excluding Christianity and Churches) for any such approach to be practially 
viable any more than it would be morally sound.
Clearly one comparative advantage of northern Churches lies on the 
international economic context and external resource support requirements of 
African employment generation strategies. Equally at least some Asian and 
Latin American Churches can provide insights into how Churches can engage in 
reflection, direct action, dialogue and mobilisation on economic issues 
including employment. Both may be able to make Africans and African Churches 
concerns more widely and effectively heard and to engage in dialogue on 
different contextual aspects of employment in the light of the Gospel message. 
They need to reflect on these points and to bear them in mind when confronting 
employment/unemployment challenges in their own countries. But, just as 
intellectual and theological leadership in Europe must and should come 
primarily from Europeans, so in Africa it must and should come primarily from 
Africans.
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